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Abstract: With the widespread adoption of ICT technologies, platforms, social media and 
sharing economy businesses have emerged as models of economic organization. This paper 
examines their functioning on a micro level to provide a thorough critique. The theory of 
cognitive capitalism and opposing arguments are explored in order to bring a holistic 
understanding and observe how value is captured and accumulated with the use of 
technological apparatuses. Cognitive capitalism is not uniform, however, and recognition of 
the special properties displayed by networks makes it possible to identify the challenge posed 
by the rising array of netarchist platforms. Platform cooperativism is the proposed egalitarian 
and long-term sustainable counter, as it aims to design new tools in line with the commons 
paradigm. Finally, the paper provides key insights into the specifications, difficulties, 
and next steps required to lead to better platform co-ops and a better future. 
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Our product is so superior to the status quo that if we give 
people the opportunity to see it or try it, in any place in 
the world where government has to be at least somewhat 
responsive to the people, they will demand it and defend 
its right to exist. 
 
“Travis law”, coined by Travis Kalanick, Uber ex-CEO 
 
Undoubtedly, the capitalist economy is going through a fascinating and overarching 
transformation, in greatest part as a result of the widespread adoption of ICT (information 
and communication technologies) and the massive accumulation of financial capital. 
Both phenomena will soon have been dominant for half a century in total. But more recently 
completely new schemes of commodity production and consumption systems have emerged 
with the rise of digital platforms. 
Multi-sided platforms – the prime example of business models in the digital era – 
combine the elegance of smartphone apps with the corporate power of organizing. 
They collect, store, and catalogue data, allow a variety of sides participate in exchanges and 
service provision, cater to the requirements of comfort, and enable rapid and secure access to 
their virtual infrastructure. It is possible to observe the emergence of a new megastructure of 
reality that runs through the physical, analogue world, but that retains a meta-level thanks to 
its information-based, cognitive quality (Bratton 2016).  
It is crucial to remember, however, that the appearance of new technologies and 
the details of their deployment are not exogenous. They are a result of specific strategies of 
research and implementation, to some extent in keeping with the will of capital. A striking 
concept envisioning such a future was Jeremy Rifkin’s The Age of Access, in which a world is 
described where every piece of reality has been privatized, commoditized, and monetized 
(Ryfkin 2000). Industrial production will lose in significance and accordingly in price 
compared to immaterial assets – knowledge, music, images, and ultimately even ideas and 
network access itself. Capturing this value is key to the power of the new dominant classes. 
But is this not, and increasingly so, the reality already faced throughout the world? 
And is it the only reality possible? 
This article is an attempt to critically analyze the micro- and macro-economic sides 
of the corporate model of digital platform. It sums up the great body of journalistic work that 
appears in public debate often, yet is still lacking in its formal grounding in economic 
literature. This practical part leads directly to a system-level discussion on cognitive capitalism 
as the new mode of capital accumulation superseding industrial capitalism. 
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Whether cognitive capitalism is truly the prevalent mode now is an empirical 
question. Here I argue that most of the counter arguments to the cognitive capitalism 
viewpoint expressed around the dot-com bubble have been invalidated by new developments 
concerning digital labor and immaterial assets. It is therefore assumed for the purpose of this 
article that cognitive capitalism has indeed become, even if spatially it is still relatively 
restricted, the primary scheme for financial capital. Cognitive capitalism is furthermore 
explored to define how digital networks function in its regime and what the specific 
conditions are regarding netarchical platforms. 
Cognitive capitalism is evolving toward its becoming a rentier state of apparatuses of 
value capture that control networks; but this evolution may well come to an end. Interest in 
the theory of commons has been flourishing recently, even finding its way into less 
theoretical debates. The rising popularity of “platform cooperativism,” a term coined by 
Trebor Scholz to describe successful applications to, and emerging theory about, the new 
praxis of digital resistance, points the way forward for a modern social economy. Egalitarian 
ownership and democratic practice among cooperatives are indeed possible on a global scale 
given the development of communications technologies. Lastly, I argue that, while multi-
stakeholder platform co-ops have their downsides, they are the most viable counter to 
cognitive capitalism as we face it now. 
 
Critique of the corporate platform 
 
The digital-era economy gives rise to many new types of organizational vehicles located on 
different parts of the value chain. Such business models operate in a variety of ways, 
as cognitive work and information data can be commoditized and monetized on the market 
in manifold fashion, especially as key terms and ideologies are used to sustain public belief in 
their benevolent nature. Such was the growth of the sharing economy trend. Though based 
on healthy assumptions about tapping into the unused or underused value of assets, 
in contrast with the typically commercial exchange of services, usually by peer-to-peer 
networks, or about frictionless trade through the elimination of middlemen, the track record 
of many sharing economy companies proves how platforms willingly and successfully dive 
deep into the new regime of financial accumulation. 
One of the most prominent examples is the case of Uber. As the largest 
representative of the sharing economy – its highest valuation reached 70 billion USD – Uber 
has managed to expand in the relatively typical sector of personal transportation. However, 
Uber’s main claim was originally that it is an IT services company, thus releasing it from all 
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regulatory responsibilities, ranging from workers’ rights to antidiscrimination laws. In this 
way, Uber is a platform that determines prices, wages, deals with payments, reputation 
systems, and supply and demand distribution, and that operates outside existing regulations, 
purely on the claim of being a technological “disruption” (Zygmuntowski 2017). This status 
has enabled it to engage in unfettered operations, thus allowing Uber to capture the market 
and extract value while breaking competition rules and defeating any law-abiding business 
rivals. 
Furthermore, it is far from the case that Uber reduces transaction costs to zero, 
something that sharing economy enthusiasts keep talking up. The company’s margin keeps 
on increasing and is well above ¼ of a single drive price. On some local markets, Uber retains 
the low price model, especially if contested by other firms, while on others it has started to 
use its strong position to extract value. A flexible pricing strategy known as surge pricing1 is also 
used to quickly boost profits from users in disadvantaged situations like terrorist attacks or 
poor weather conditions. Such an approach is defined by the realities of capitalism and 
the pressure of big capital, as investors who have spent years burning cash for Uber need 
a safe return on their investment and place great pressure on the firm. 
Another widely recognized sharing-economy company that is causing negative 
spillovers is Airbnb. Many European and American cities have taken steps against 
the enterprise, from imposing fines and inspections to a complete ban on short-term rentals. 
High profits gained by landlords thanks to tourists have largely contributed to the process of 
gentrification of entire neighborhoods and blocks of flats. Rent raising and the unnatural 
growth of house prices in cities highly attractive to tourists, such as Paris, Barcelona, or New 
York, has led to a spoiling of the real estate market and a slump in the supply of available 
housing, which has impacted negatively on the quality of life of local residents and businesses 
(Lee 206). 
A great variety of arguments address the problem of work instability and low labor 
protection standards, a problem that became widespread with the adoption of gig economy 
platforms. With self-employment and on-demand flexibility undermining the distinction 
between work and free time, and zero-hour contracts and other forms of employment 
pushing responsibility onto the “contractor,” such work arrangements have been denounced 
many times. Some of those complaints have been upheld in courts – examples include 
the notable cases built against Uber and Lyft. This devaluation of labor and 
                                               
1
 “During times of  high demand for rides, fares may increase to make sure those who need a ride can get 
one […] When you’re online, your app displays areas with high demand for rides in shades of  red. The deeper 
the shade of  red, the greater that area’s demand […] Surge rates are charged as a multiplier of  X.X. 
For example, a rider in a surging area may see and accept a surge multiplier of  1.3x or 2.1x. This surge 
multiplier applies to the base, time, and distance of  the trip fare.” Source: https://help.uber.com/h/e9375d5e-
917b-4bc5-8142-23b89a440eec 
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the commodification of workers themselves has even been referred to as Humans-as-a-Service 
(Kowalik 2017). 
The concern over unclear platform policies also raises questions. Due to 
the technological advancement of the platforms, the precise architecture of system 
operations, data analysis, and information gathering, together with their influence on 
the presented services and products, or market access, remain largely unknown. Most of 
these platforms, whether part of the sharing economy, social media, or search engines, 
restrict access to their internal functions or clear paths with open APIs (Application 
Programming Interface) only for their own professional products (like ad management) 
or for selected partners – a business strategy rather than an attempt to pioneer transparency. 
Not knowing has its consequences. Big data analysis may reinforce stereotypes and 
negative profiling by identifying correlation as causation (Crawford, Schultz 2014). Patterns, 
though, are often the visible end results of multivariable complex systems, which 
the algorithm sees as simple equations if so coded. Platforms may use their mechanisms to 
discreetly favour some groups or change the parameters of the market to maximize profit, 
even if it counters user experience. Some cases of tech profiling show extreme dangers – e.g., 
the Value-Added Model used for many years to assess teachers in the US showed clear 
inconsistency and had no accountability, yet it served its role by creating a proof-like outcome 
to explain significant job losses (O’Neil 2016). 
In other situations, sharing economy platforms were able to reduce negative 
profiling, but choose not to. This was the case with Airbnb and its evident discrimination of 
African Americans (Edelman, Luca, Svirsky 2017). The findings from Fiverr and TaskRabbit 
– online freelance marketplaces – also show evidence of bias. Perceived user gender and race 
are significantly correlated with worker evaluations, which may harm the employment 
opportunities afforded to the workers (Hannák et al. 2017). 
Arbitrary decision-making and lack of transparency may result in users accepting the 
mechanisms manipulating supply and demand sides, even though they would never accept 
them on traditional, analogue markets or if given more governance choices. However, very 
often the platforms or algorithms used are proprietary brands, and so their internal 
construction is considered a trade secret. Users are presented with a “black box,” with little 
or no possibility of understanding, appeal, or co-governing (Pasquale 2016). 
The very same critique applies to other kinds of platforms that remain outside 
the sharing economy paradigm. Retail websites, marketplaces, and social media as digital 
infrastructure operate in the same way. Whether Facebook, Instagram, or Alibaba, 
the methods used by such companies are profit-oriented and strictly hierarchical, 
even though they became socialized and common through practice (Fuchs 2013). 
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Currently the observed growth of multi-sided platforms market is mainly being 
driven by positive network externalities, which are responsible for rising value if new users 
adopt the product (Katz, Shapiro 1985). It can be easily concluded that the optimal state is 
almost full concentration of the respective market, thus guaranteeing maximum supply and 
demand on all sides, and, as a consequence, more transactions and more data, which can fuel 
the further modeling of mechanisms and constant development of platform offers. Given 
such a situation, a company might consciously internalize negative network externalities, i.e., 
unwanted competition between supply providers, with specifically constructed algorithms, 
which diminishes the decrease in marginal positive network externalities growth (Li, Liu, 
Bandyopadhyay 2010). 
Some academics believe that the possible negative consequences of strong market 
oligopolization will never occur, as low costs of change uphold competitive pressure on 
prices (Doligalski 2013). However, there is a scarcity of strong arguments supporting the idea 
that multihoming – the process of constant comparison and usage of different solutions – 
will hold. One of the most specific characteristics of multi-sided platforms is their close to 
zero marginal cost per user, combined with their very low cost of market entrance (as per se 
entrance, not market capture). The optimal growth strategy, then, is to take part 
simultaneously in a technological and network building race. 
Such competition is most likely to finish with a monopoly or at least an oligopoly, 
in which the market is no longer homogenous, due to the technologies used and 
the networks, which constitute different social groups. As a result the cost of change is 
substantial. We might observe this phenomenon in the technological heterogeneity (and 
accordingly social and cultural), and thus the cost of change, between Apple and Microsoft 
products, or membership on Facebook and vKontakte. More than accurate is 
the oligopolistic competition model of Reinhard Selten, in which demand relies not only on 
current prices, but to a large extent on the inertia of demand from previous periods (Selten 
1968). The network externalities of digital platforms are many times stronger than in 
traditional, analogue business models and resemble rather the problems of natural 
monopolies. 
We should also recall that platform users not only pay in the form of accepted 
monetary currency, but they also bring other values – their time and data. Every moment 
spent watching advertisements, on content co-creation or on providing service feedback is in 
fact a new payment. Private data constitute the highest form of intellectual property value, 
which allows for further technological refinement and control over the platform market, 
and through it the social and economic dimensions of the world (Ezrachi 2016). 
Through these means platforms become “network rentiers,” as Rachel O’Dwyer 
calls them (O’Dwyer 2015). The problem with rentier capitalism, which has been debated 
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since the classical economy of Adam Smith and analyzed in-depth by Marxist economists, 
returns in the form of platform infrastructure, which abuses its monopolistic position to 
charge fees (even if, for a period of time, it may subsidize consumption to gain a foothold in 
the market). In the end, this amounts to a new process of primitive accumulation through 
enclosing common, public spaces – this time in artificially created, digital space – as a 
repetition of the often brutal and chaotic transition from feudalism to capitalism. David 
Harvey argues that the accumulation process continues wherever dispossession from public 
spaces and privatization of the commons takes place (Harvey 2005). Another theory is 
proposed by Hardt and Negri, who propose the two terms formal subsumption, 
which describes capital’s drawing pre-existing labor relations into itself while taking control 
over means of production and compelling worker to wage-labor, and real subsumption, 
which characterizes capital’s transforming and embedding all relations to comply with the 
profit-motive (Hardt, Negri 2017). ICT can be observed to influence both, although here it is 
formal subsumption that serves to explain how capitalism can pave its way to gain control 
over new fictitious commodities. 
It seems justified to state that platforms seem to be attempts to enter and 
monopolize areas traditionally stewarded not only by the market, but also considered to be 
common, public and municipal goods. Many of the well-noted spillovers of platforms, such 
as ousting public transport, profit transfers, pressure on worker’s rights, urban development, 
and other public-provided services, have gained the interest of global financial capital, 
which is constantly seeking new tools for economic extraction and social impact. 
It is therefore crucial to observe digital multi-sided platforms as a product, as a tool 
of a bigger system. One of the most investor-acclaimed traits of platforms is their asset light 
model. The digital business model is the final step in full value chain decomposition, in which 
the platform takes place as a “meta” layer of the economy, where all the other participants – 
clients, suppliers, producers, and analogue business partners – remain in the decision 
hierarchy but below the platform, even though they face most of the business responsibilities. 
Such observations have led Nick Srnicek to present a typology of platforms, which divides 
the landscape of the new infrastructure into five main categories: 
 
1) advertizing platforms, which extract data from users, analyze it, and sell marketing 
services (e.g. Google, Facebook); 
2) cloud platforms, which rent basic hardware and software to digital-dependent 
businesses (e.g. Amazon Web Services, Salesforce); 
3) industrial platforms, which build internet-connected, smart manufacturing tools 
(e.g. GE, Siemens); 
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4) product platforms, which capitalize on turning assets into stream of services, enabling 
rent collection (e.g. Rolls-Royce, Spotify); 
5) lean platforms, which aims to reduce costs and liabilities to a minimum 
(e.g. Uber, Airbnb) (Srnicek 2016). 
 
Out of the presented platform models, three of them – advertizing, cloud, and lean – 
take almost exclusively the form of digital platforms. Product platforms can be of different 
types, depending on the type of good that is “streamed” (which may range from digital books 
and audio to patented formulas or even the brand itself), while industrial platforms bridge 
physical hardware with digital networks. It should be thought of as not only the much-
anticipated Internet of Things and Industry 4.0, but also the power that Google and Apple 
hold with everyday smartphone operating systems (iOS, Android) and the keys to that power. 
Platforms have to a large extent become a vehicle for international, unrestrained 
capital, motivated solely by profit and fueled by a specific culture formed in Silicon Valley. 
For venture capital funds, the platform is the ultimate form of the logic claiming that 
business is merely a revenue stream. The fewer the assets and operational activities, the more 
stable and easy-to-control the profit flows are. Financial means, processed via the black box 
of platforms and groups dedicated to them, should exit on the other side as ROI (Return on 
Investment). Little wonder then that in 2016 American VC funds invested almost 60 bln 
USD in new projects, most of which were platforms and marketplaces (Langley, Leyshon 
2016). 
Production system of cognitive capitalism 
 
A close assessment of new digital ventures reveals extractionary goals, which are central to 
the functioning of these ventures. The rising influence of corporate digital platform 
companies largely contributes to the dismantling of social sustainability, welfare, and long-
term maintenance. But in no way is their rise a sign of deviation from the proper workings of 
the market system – they are signs of the developmental continuity of capitalism itself. 
 The aim of this section is to provide theoretical underpinnings to the empirical 
problems found in the system comprised of corporate platforms. The literature on cognitive 
and netarchical capitalism provides conflicting models for understanding the modern 
economy, yet their synthesis brings some conclusions that are of extremely high relevance if 
any countermeasures to capitalism are to be proposed. 
The socio-economic organization of production systems has been dynamically 
changing since the Taylorist model proved inadequate to new challenges. The increase and 
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widespread adoption of the new ICT technologies has impacted the industrial paradigm, 
allowing for a transition into the postindustrial information age (Hutchinson 2008). 
The observed process is marked by a continually diminishing manual labor component in 
the economy organized around the production of physical goods, and a corresponding 
increase in the value and scope of a knowledge, information-based labor component that is 
organized around the provision of services. The postindustrial paradigm perceives knowledge 
as the most valuable factor in terms of productivity. 
Numerous authors have argued with the “knowledge-based economy” hypothesis, 
the so-called “death of distance,” and other postindustrial concepts that are so often eagerly 
used by business managers and analysts seeking to take advantage from participation in 
the reproduction of social relations and thus generate profit. The four main strands of 
the critique rely on the following arguments: that the Western perspective of high value-
added activities and robust capital intensity should not obscure the outsourced low-skill jobs 
and “traditional” capitalism operating in the rest of the world; that the great shift in 
capitalism leaves rather unremarkable signs on productivity factors; that worker mobility and 
connectedness on a global level is far from the proposed global, virtual workforce; 
and, finally, that the digital and networked Internet is embedded in capitalism and so only 
further extends its dynamics in all the spheres it touches (Huws 1999, Fisher 2010). 
  Whether that critique will continue to be valid is unclear, although some of 
the points made at the time of the dot-com bubble may now be defunct. Indeed, the global 
division of labor pushed manufacturing far from the line of sight of Western academia, yet 
the introduction of personal smartphones and further Internet expansion – from 5% global 
user penetration in 1999 to 48% in 2017, and as much as 70.6% for young people (ITU 2017) 
– as well as the popular use of digital platforms, software, and codified knowledge in all types 
of business in every sector prove that manufacturing and even low value-added services as 
well are undergoing a critical change. Globalization is truly allowing the workforce to become 
worldwide, to the extent that the Global South is being forcibly drawn into digital 
workspaces, an example being the World Bank’s program “m2work,” which plugs hundreds 
of Palestinians in Gaza into the Amazon Mechanical Turk cognitive labor platform. 
It is crucial to understand the spatial limitations of capitalism, which has its own geographic 
dynamics. One might even argue that industrial capitalism took much longer to reach 
the edges of colonial agricultural powerhouses than cognitive capitalism has. 
Finally, the debate as to whether ICT is just another technology embedded in 
existing capitalist social relations and its organization of production; or whether it marks 
a critical shift that changes the nature of the system, may miss the point. No technology 
is exogenous, although its deployment may entirely change the nature of a previous mode of 
production, which is what Hardt and Negri’s real subsumption describes for the case of 
Jan J. Zygmuntowski: Commoning in the Digital… 
 
177 
capitalist production (Hardt, Negri 2017). It seems indisputable that the famed “disruption” 
refers exactly to the process of creative, almost Schumpeterian destruction of previous modes 
of organizing the value chain and labor, just as we saw with electricity in the second industrial 
revolution. For those reasons, a sound theory of digital, cognitive, and netarchical capitalism 
is more relevant now than back when first hypotheses were formed, sometimes in a visionary, 
ahead-of-the-time manner. 
The dynamic growth of new services and knowledge-based markets, born by 
the absorption of different artistic and creative activities as new types of wage labor, has met 
with attempts at definition and classification within the wider body of economic literature. 
Marxist Autonomists have proposed the term of “immaterial labor” to define how affective 
and cognitive states of humans are captured and monetized under the capitalist regime 
(Lazzarato, Negri 1991; Brouillette 2009). Current works on regimes of accumulation, 
and systems and models of production, which have transformed from Fordist and Taylorist 
times to our postindustrial era, have coined the phrase “cognitive capitalism” to mark the 
third stage of the capitalist system (Vercellone 2007). 
Cognitive capitalism departs from neoclassical theories of the “knowledge-based 
economy,” which support endogenous growth models, as well as from purely socio-technical 
analyses of civilizational development. The process of capital accumulation requires having 
control over and support for the transition from tacit to codified knowledge in order to 
commoditize it and extract possible value. Knowledge is useful insofar it produces a return 
on investments. However, cognitive capitalism draws on pre-existing conditions of 
knowledge production (Fumagalli, Lucarelli 2007). Mikołaj Ratajczak describes the following 
paradox: 
 
Social antagonisms, such as the protest against privatizing the sectors necessary to 
produce “silent knowledge” (the institution of education), the codification of some 
knowledge types (DNA, personal data, etc.) and the imposition of proprietary 
relations on newer and newer forms of codified knowledge, arise against this 
backdrop. The production of social knowledge requires not only unrestrained access 
to codified knowledge, but also to the most basic resources of cognitive labor – 
attention and time. The battle for those resources introduces a new type of 
antagonism: ways of measuring cognitive labor differ substantially from ways of 
measuring industrial labor. Social conflicts are born therefore both as a result of access 
restriction to codified knowledge (by intellectual property laws) and of attention 
resources (which are restricted by the costs of social reproduction) (Ratajczak 2015). 
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The rise of new production models should be seen as a development of not only 
new possibilities for growth and freedom, but new methods of exploitation and capital 
accumulation as well (Vercellone 2007). Although emerging from welfare state and social 
policies aimed at easing the burden of industrial capitalism, cognitive capitalism undermines 
those very social relations. The prerequisites of this new form of accumulation are high R&D 
investments, and strong social and human capital. Private enterprises have come to benefit 
from the activities of the general intellect, while avoiding most of its related costs. 
In the search for perfect investment opportunities, global financial capital now 
desists from directly investing in production processes, instead opting for the creation of 
apparatuses of value capture (Ratajczak 2015). It is no longer satisfactory to invest in 
production that generates income higher than costs. Under cognitive capitalism, the greatest 
return is not on wages and the means of production, but on vehicles that capture and extract 
value resulting from knowledge and information networks built on social reproduction. 
Extracted value is then rarely invested in production, so that the domination of accumulation 
typical of the regime of cognitive capitalism over the more stable, industrial, and analogue 
regimes is reinforced. This rent-seeking activity is limited not only to financial power, 
but occurs in governance and decision-making as well. 
An important observation is that cognitive capitalism does not undermine the labor 
theory of value approach. Value creation and value extraction/capture are complementary 
processes, as the former describes the workers’ side of the economy (no new value can be 
created without labor), whereas the latter depicts the ways in which capital obtains profit with 
new mechanisms. Intellectual property allows for the extraction of value through creative 
labor. There is nothing surprising other than that working conditions may still continue to 
deteriorate or that employment defiantly exists; cognitive capitalism focuses attention on 
new means of profit extraction, which turn from the ownership of physical capital to 
immaterial assets. At the same time, it describes the increasing exchange- and use-value of 
intellectual labor in the digital environment. 
However, cognitive capitalism is not uniform, just as industrial production has its 
own value chains with some businesses operating in positions of stronger or weaker 
bargaining power concerning profits. Assessing the power of digital platforms, we might 
observe that what dominates in the new regime is network infrastructure, even though global 
companies founded on intellectual property laws (patents, unique software, etc.) have 
burgeoned in recent decades. That observation is consistent with other theories describing 
the current system of production. McKenzie Wark introduced the so-called vectoral thesis in 
A Hacker Manifesto, in which he claims that through the capture of attention and affection, 
the dominating vectoral class holds all the vectors of information (Wark 2004). Control over 
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the means of communication, media, and platforms then makes it possible to reproduce the 
value of possessed intellectual assets, such as patents and brands. 
But among the vectoralists, a booming sub-class exists that is even more powerful in 
terms of the magnitude and stability of their dominance. Michel Bauwens has proposed 
an alternative theory of netarchical capitalism, according to which the emerging class is 
constituted more by enablers and controllers of peer-to-peer, crowd-based, participatory, and 
co-creative networks (Kostakis, Bauwens 2014). Bauwens separates netarchists from all other 
cognitive capitalist agents, claiming that the peer-to-peer trait is more profound than vectoral 
control over information distribution or general knowledge assets capture. As he explains: 
 
Compared to the cognitive capitalists and vectoralists, who respectively monopolize 
knowledge assets and information vectors, netarchists need neither one nor the other. 
Thus they do not necessarily side with the forces trying to rig computers with digital 
rights management restrictions, nor with the forces putting young people who share 
music in jail. 
 
What Bauwens stresses here is that netarchists are immune to one of the two antagonisms 
that constitute cognitive capitalism. They still are subject to the social reproduction and 
attention limitations, yet they are not restrained with the need to produce knowledge assets 
protected by intellectual property laws. This leverage is enough to define their special status. 
The netarchical class resides on top of the new regime of accumulation, positioning itself 
at critical network nodes and acting as liquidity brokers in this, the data-driven era. 
Netarchists and their platforms have been long seen as advocates of freedom and 
open access, though in fact this applies only to the freedom of passing through their domain, 
not to the exercise of its governance. As netarchists can never have full legal or economic 
certainty that their specific platform will remain popular and widely used in the future, 
they have to keep their users constantly engaged and feeling appreciated. This is the precise 
foundation of the co-creation and participatory model that many of those companies 
embrace, especially in the social media sector. An affective bond is a prerequisite of trust, 
much needed when profit-oriented strategies come into play. 
Those theories should be seen as complementary rather than opposing. Certainly, 
cognitive capitalism, understood as a financial mode of production that creates tools of value 
capture and thus reinstates rents over information flows, is the most comprehensive theory 
for explaining not only the rise of digital platforms, but also the preceding shift from 
industrial labor to services and cognitive labor. Vectoralists herald the idea that intellectual 
assets are only as strong as the means of spreading them through key system nodes. 
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In the end, the netarchical class is formed of a body of competing cognitive business models, 
which all aim to position themselves on top of the new, data-driven value chains. Multi-sided 
platforms do exactly that by controlling the information flows and networking possibilities 
between agents – whether they are freelance workers, industry production suppliers, 
or individuals exercising their spare time. All the new types of codified knowledge and 
collective value that are created as a result of network interactions can then be extracted in 
the form of pure rent by the platform owners as the sole governors of the node. 
The dominant cognitive capitalist class and the digital infrastructure it operates can 
extract rent only if hackers, understood as programmers, creatives, and knowledge workers, 
create new apparatuses. As long as the social reproduction antagonism remains quite stable – 
the labor market functions, industrial production continues, innovation and knowledge can 
be accessed, social or political unrest is below levels that would tear institutions apart – the 
key to dismantling cognitive capitalism lies in the hands of the hacker class. Just as new 
technologies allow for the creation of new apparatuses of value capture, so too may they be 
used for the purpose of shared, egalitarian governance, and a sustainable business ethics. 
 
The case for platform cooperativism 
 
The most recent evolution of cognitive capitalism sets the stage for a new type of conflict, 
one just as globalized as the basic premises of netarchical power. According to the theory of 
the dialectical double movement developed by Karl Polanyi, every process of 
commodification and marketization – insofar as it aims to dis-embed the economy from 
society and thus subordinate social relations to the market – is closely followed by 
a countermovement that seeks to protect the most marginalized groups and re-embed 
the economy (Polanyi 1944). This is the historical condition that has again arrived, as 
cognitive capitalism has reached its peak in the form of digital platforms and netarchical 
power. 
However, new apparatuses of value capture are, in startup jargon, born global. 
Even though some resistance efforts on the part of unionized workers and cautious state 
administrations are undertaken locally, the solutions that prove themselves useful will need to 
be just as global as the most successful platforms – and this will mean utilizing network 
effects and driving innovation to stay on top of corporate-backed disruption. Platform 
cooperatives can be therefore seen as an attempt to present a full-fledged alternative that 
leads to mass emancipation (Mikołajewska-Zając, Rodak 2016). 
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Platform cooperativism as a modern form of organic social struggle has been 
envisioned for some time. Various sources put forward a praxis of resistance through 
proprietary technology, one owned by the workers’ themselves. It was the leading voice of 
Trebor Scholz of the New School for Social Research who coined the term “platform 
cooperativism.” His widely cited, online article “Platform Cooperativism vs the Sharing 
Economy” has redefined the problem of the sharing economy and platform capitalism 
in general by offering a clear choice of return to the roots of collective organizing, 
while simultaneously fully embracing new technologies (Scholz 2014). 
Scholz argues that the free participation of equal partners engaged in the production 
of common resources (in Bauwens’ understanding), or networked peer production as 
a collective action carried out for distributed, non-market mechanism (in Benkler’s 
understanding), can benefit from the traditions of cooperatives. The oft-cited example of 
Spanish Mondragon proves that cooperatives are not limited to some sectors only; their 
model displays high competitiveness and long-term sustainability as well, even when 
confronted with competition on purely market terms. The solidarity economy has proven 
in the past, and is continuing to do so in many places in the world, that a different model for 
organizing labor exists and that it is a viable alternative to corporate hierarchy. 
The core premise of platform cooperativism, then, is to clone the “technological 
heart” of the new, digital platforms – social media, sharing economy, freelance websites, retail 
marketplaces and other types – while redesigning algorithms and the ownership structure 
so that they become transparent, democratic, and revenue-redistributive in their nature. 
Scholz believes that such platform co-ops are the panacea to the malaise of late cognitive 
capitalism: 
 
Worker-owned cooperatives can offer an alternative model of social organization to 
address financial instability. They will need to be collectively owned, democratically 
controlled businesses, with a mission to anchor jobs, offer health insurance and 
pension funds, and a degree of dignity (Scholz 2014). 
 
There is no single blueprint for the ideal platform co-op. Each attempt can be assessed by 
how far it departs from the extractive and dominance-ridden model. In order to understand 
what the endpoint is – the utopian goal that digital solidarity economy should strive for – 
the key values should be identified. 
According to Michel Bauwens, these aspects are three: sustainability, openness and 
solidarity (Bauwens 2016). The co-creation of the commons should be overseen by open, 
participatory governance models that include all stakeholders. Long-term sustainability – 
Praktyka Teoretyczna 1(27)/2018 
 
182 
both internal, that is, arising from an equal distribution of power and remuneration, and 
external, that is, in relation with the environment – could also distinguish platform co-ops as 
being more resistant and rooted in their respective communities, in stark contrast to 
the disruptive, yet often short-lived conquest of cognitive and netarchical attempts to install 
new tools of value capture. Finally, even though many platform cooperatives produce and 
exist locally, their mechanisms should be open to upscaling (platform as a Creative 
Commons, as it were) and globally networked with other, similar pockets of resistance against 
cognitive capitalism. 
There are a couple of different approaches to platform cooperativism the diverge on 
the issue of who exactly should be in control. Although it is widely agreed that workers 
themselves should participate to the fullest extent, the question is whether other stakeholders, 
including potential capital investors, governments, or for-profit backers should have 
equivalent governance rights. Some platforms may operate in a strictly non-profit manner to 
provide basic services to the community, yet legally function as municipal, publicly owned 
companies. Scholz introduces a typology of platform cooperatives, according to which 
different platform co-ops are distinguished by their specific ownership models: 
 
1) cooperatively owned, online labor brokerages and market places, which belong to 
their workers, freelancers, or online shop owners, of which Loconomics freelancer 
co-op and Fairmondo decentralized e-commerce platform are highly successful 
examples; 
2) city-owned platform cooperatives, which might be based on municipal utilities 
providers or used to pool local resources, such as rental spaces or shared 
transportation – there the Sharing Cities Alliance initiatives have paved the way for 
new urban co-ops to emerge; 
3) producer-owned2 platforms, which cater to the specific needs of groups that are both 
“produsers” and consumers of the content, such as music streaming platform 
Resonate, or artist-owned Stocksy for stock photography, both of which utilize 
mechanisms combining the dual nature of their userbase; 
4) union-backed labor platforms, which build on the organizing power, resources, and 
know-how of occupational unions. The US taxi sector provides us with many local 
examples proving that unions are capable of launching technological offensives 
as well (Scholz 2016). 
 
                                               
2
 “Produser” is a portmanteau phrase combining “producer” and “user” to denote the two groups 
overlapping.  
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Platform co-ops are emerging as the great new chapter of the old collective organization and 
egalitarian ownership story, since they are able to address issues of democratic governance, 
equitable income distribution, sustainability, and transparency. The technologies they are built 
on can indeed be cloned from the corporate platforms built on the premises of cognitive 
capitalism or netarchist rent-seeking at the network nodes. Most economists agree that 
worker cooperatives are in general more efficient than shareholder corporations, especially if 
the diversity of contributions across workers is low, external competitive pressure diminishes, 
and investments stagnate, something that is often due to low labor costs as well. The taxi 
sector might be a prime example – as the provision of car rides is rather uniform and 
competition is restricted by pure logistics, each local market is contestable once a platform 
co-op obtains the proper digital technology and funding to get traction. 
Not all platforms are born equal, however. Which ownership and decision-making 
model is optimal for a given platform co-op? How are we to mitigate all the downsides of 
corporate platforms and not only envision but actually build a better working world with 
digital commons that are globally scalable while retaining their beneficial nature? How are we 
even to get real people, embedded in the current system, on the side of platform 
cooperatives? 
 
Next steps for the development of a viable alternative 
 
The challenge of facing cognitive capitalism and its newest form of netarchical platforms is 
not only a problem of mobilizing people around some technological tools. It is about 
redesigning them so that they offer realistically better working conditions, better user 
experience, and so that they value engagement in governance processes. It is essential, 
therefore, to focus on assessing the different models from a systemic perspective, 
on developing platforms as ecosystems of mechanisms, on algorithms, and on rules that 
uphold all the values cherished by cooperatives. 
Building on Juliet Schor’s observations that many idealistic, yet abstract projects lack 
clear value proposition that would attract larger communities, Trebor Scholz has proposed 
ten principles for platform co-ops when addressing the major problems in the cognitive 
capitalism regime of accumulation. Those ten principles of the early platform cooperativism 
debate are: 
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1) ownership; 
2) decent pay and income security; 
3) transparency and data portability; 
4) appreciation and acknowledgment; 
5) co-determined work; 
6) a protective legal framework; 
7) portable worker protections and benefits; 
8) protection against arbitrary behavior; 
9) the rejection of excessive workplace surveillance; 
10) and the right to log off (Scholz 2016). 
 
Marina Gorbis of the Institute for the Future argues for a different set of rules, some of 
which overlap with Scholz’s, whilst including others identified in the process of conducting 
research on gig economy workers. Her set of rules are based on her subjective experiences, 
yet show how Scholz’s list omits some significant aspects: 
 
1) earnings maximization; 
2) stability and predictability; 
3) transparency – both on the algorithmic and data levels; 
4) the portability of products and reputations; 
5) upskilling – meaning acquiring new skills and creating pathways for advancement; 
6) social connectedness – overcoming the barrier of atomized, individual work; 
7) bias elimination; 
8) and feedback mechanisms (Gorbis 2017). 
 
It is clear that what the workers themselves are expressing here are need for creating 
communities and connecting outside strictly job-related communications. This sense of 
cohesion also fosters labor rights advocacy. Another notable feature is upskilling, which 
proves that lifelong learning is not only a slogan of cognitive capitalism-era slogan, but 
for many people is desirable as a way to develop careers and improve living standards.  
Discussing bias elimination is especially problematic if an attempt is made to 
confront the reality of today’s platforms. Juliet Schor’s studies of platforms that 
are volunteer-run and have features of cooperatives have led to quite disturbing findings. 
Status-seeking, less visible, subtle forms of social-exclusion, and other non-egalitarian 
behaviors have persisted in them, while gender, racial, and class inequalities are highly 
pervasive, if not threatening to their very viability (Schor 2017). High cultural capital was 
often a prerequisite of even finding and joining such a platform. Thus, an awareness of social 
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dynamics are required, not to mention decisive steps to combat the influence of socially 
dominant groups, if platform co-ops are to function in broader society. The active 
involvement of new social groups, right from the outset, should also be encouraged. 
It is also extremely important to remember that mono-stakeholder platforms are still 
capable of exploitation and value capture. Given a position of market dominance, 
cooperatives can always depart from valuing external sustainability designed to favor 
maximizing workers’ profits, and thus become netarchical extractionary apparatuses – 
but ones that are also great workplaces. This is the key reason why multi-stakeholder co-ops 
should be considered, with different classes of shares reserved for different groups. Michel 
Bauwens proposes that founders could be rewarded with shares that diminish over time, 
preventing them from turning into a life-long rent; furthermore, a similar scheme would 
apply to ethical investors who are willing to take the risk and support the initiative (Bauwens 
2016). Other mechanisms would be dedicated to workers, users, and other stakeholders (local 
residents, etc.). Such a proposal recognizes the co-creative norm of modern cognitive 
capitalism. In this vein, the best practices of Somerset Rules are often mentioned: launched in 
the UK in 2009, they are written in plain English and combine many tested multi-stakeholder 
co-op models into a single, ready-to-use framework (Somerset Co-operative Services 2014). 
A reflection on strategies of building up reveals that one way would be to create 
a new platform, although securing financing and having a strong core team with business 
skills strong enough to compete with incumbents might be a stretch too far. That is why 
cooperative financing and crowdfunding are extremely important. Still, in many cases 
an attempt can be made to render cognitive capitalism more humane. Or, in Brendan 
Martin’s words, to convert it (Martin 2017). The goal is not to build a Facebook 2.0, but, 
if possible, to change its model. As many netarchical platforms have become global public 
utilities and attracted the attention of policymakers and critical thinkers alike, operating 
a platform might make it easier to put serious pressure on these groups – and should this fail, 
then the given platform ought to probably be abandoned. 
Finally, platform co-ops are too frequently launched either in the startup model, 
or as a byproduct of short-lived activism. What is needed, however, is to convince unions 
that investment in digital platforms and promoting them amongst union members is 
potentially highly beneficial in the long-term. An experiment with new public services is 
needed at the municipal level, including the open crowdsourcing of urban development issues 
and complex real-estate platforms that would include short-time rentals (Airbnb style) as well 
as long-term ones, property rights, taxes, and even algorithms able to drive margins down 
by aiding a city’s residents to counter real-estate owners and speculators. What is needed are 
state-backed or other publicly funded incubators and digital programs aimed at seeking 
the best solutions to communicate, freelance, trade, and innovate on the foundation of the 
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digital commons. In his latest book, Scholz proposes that we view platform co-ops as part of 
the broader cooperative ecosystem, and thus turns our attention towards funding schemes, 
alliance-building, legal and engineering staffing, and software standards as well (Scholz 2017). 
His remarks on the seductive UX design again amplify the argument about the need to learn 
from startups and corporate “death stars” in order to effectively build them better. All those 
undertakings would greatly support the existing plethora of collectives that often lack 
the scale to burgeon properly, or even to utilize platform cooperativism to its maximum 
capacity. 
 
Conclusions 
 
As cognitive capitalism has matured, the fight for dominance over the value chain is coming 
to an end. Netarchists, by controlling key sharing economy platforms, marketplaces, and 
social media, will stay on top by extracting value directly from data flows. The new rentiers 
have come and hitherto they reign unobstructed, even as the deficiencies of their business 
models can be easily observed and described in detail. 
Platform cooperatives seem the most promising of the possible answers. They make 
a bold statement by combining long-standing traditions with the most recent technology. 
An egalitarian, democratic, and peer-to-peer world needs its own infrastructure – and digital 
co-ops are the way to go. This answer may not be the perfect and final one, as some 
questions will still linger. Is it possible for a digital cooperative to reach the scale required to 
undertake massive investments and possibly lead to another breakthrough in technology that 
would enable it to stay ahead of the cognitive capitalist competition? 
It is worth noting that platform co-ops need not necessarily be a perfect solution. 
If they prove better than cognitive capitalism apparatuses, they will undoubtedly serve their 
purpose. Nathan Schneider recounts his talks with Amazon Mechanical Turk workers at 
the Digital Labor conference, where they shared their many stories of abuse on the platform. 
But connecting also allowed for empowerment, even if brief: 
Over the course of those days, a kind of question kept coming up among the Turkers, 
a thought experiment. They wondered aloud: What if we owned the platform? 
How would we set the rules? 
They’d sit with that for a minute or two, batting ideas back and forth about how to 
make the platform better for themselves – and for Amazon. Reasonable ideas. Clever 
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ones. But then ideas would fade back into reality again: back to the complaints 
(Schneider 2017). 
Could this community become resilient and organized enough to create an alternative? Such 
a notion might be doubted. The financial capital roaming around the cognitive capitalist 
regime has the resources to combat all resistance, and buy the latest technology to always 
remain competitive. The netarchist class is already reinforcing its position in some markets, 
while in others there is still more hope. The only keys that they lack are: the real appreciation 
of users, who are now awakening to new possibilities and the benefits that collective, 
egalitarian, and open processes may provide given time. It remains unclear however, if these 
are enough for the commons paradigm to thrive in the digital era. 
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TYTUŁ: Commoning w erze cyfrowej: platformowy kooperatyzm jako odpowiedź na 
kapitalizm kognitywny 
ABSTRAKT: Wraz z rozpowszechnieniem technologii ICT wyłoniły się modele organizacji 
ekonomicznej takie jak platformy, media społecznościowe oraz firmy gospodarki 
współdzielenia (sharing economy). Autor artykułu analizuje ich funkcjonowanie na poziomie 
mikro- i dostarcza szeregu argumentów krytycznych. Eksploracja teorii kapitalizmu 
kognitywnego i stanowisk ustosunkowanych wobec niej polemicznie pozwala na uzyskanie 
holistycznego obrazu sytuacji oraz na obserwację tego, jak wartość jest przechwytywana i 
akumulowana przy użyciu aparatów technologicznych. Kapitalizm kognitywny nie jest jednak 
jednorodny, a dostrzeżenie szczególnych właściwości cechujących sieci pozwala 
zidentyfikować wyzwanie rzucone nam przez rosnącą liczbę netarchicznych platform. 
Platformowy kooperatyzm jest ujmowany jako egalitarna i zrównoważona w długim okresie 
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odpowiedź na te zjawiska, gdyż celem tej idei jest projektowanie nowych narzędzi 
funkcjonujących w zgodzie z paradygmatem dobra wspólnego (the commons). Wreszcie w 
artykule wskazane zostały kluczowe detale, trudności i następne kroki prowadzące do 
tworzenia lepszych platformowych kooperatyw i lepszej przyszłości. 
SŁOWA KLUCZOWE: platformowy kooperatyzm, kapitalizm kognitywny, gospodarka 
współdzielenia, wartość, cyfrowe dobra wspólne. 
